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This study demonstrates that an adoption of a segmenting and shielding strat-
egy could increase the scope to partially exit COVID-19 lockdown while
limiting the risk of an overwhelming second wave of infection. We illustrate
this using a mathematical model that segments the vulnerable population
and their closest contacts, the ‘shielders’. Effects of extending the duration of
lockdown and faster or slower transition to post-lockdown conditions and,
most importantly, the trade-off between increased protection of the vulnerable
segment and fewer restrictions on the general population are explored. Our
study shows that the most important determinants of outcome are: (i) post-
lockdown transmission rates within the general and between the general
and vulnerable segments; (ii) fractions of the population in the vulnerable
and shielder segments; (iii) adherence to protective measures; and (iv) build-
up of population immunity. Additionally, we found that effective measures
in the shielder segment, e.g. intensive routine screening, allow further relax-
ations in the general population. We find that the outcome of any future
policy is strongly influenced by the contact matrix between segments and
the relationships between physical distancing measures and transmission
rates. This strategy has potential applications for any infectious disease for
which there are defined proportions of the population who cannot be treated
or who are at risk of severe outcomes.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.
1. Introduction
As of 31 August 2020, 25 085 685 confirmed COVID-19 cases and 843 927 COVID-
19-related deaths had been reported globally [1,2]. Countries around the world
have imposed severe physical distancing measures—‘lockdown’—on their entire




Figure 1. A contact structure for the 20-20-60 model. There are five seg-
ments, each comprising 20% of the total. v = vulnerable; s = shielders;
g = general population. Transmission occurs within and between segments.
Transmission rates within and between the three g segments are always
homogeneous, but may vary within and between segments of different




2(though not fully quantified) societal, psychological and econ-
omic harm, and have major indirect impacts on healthcare
provision [3], so there is an urgent need to find ways of exiting
lockdown safely.
Here, we consider one option for facilitating exit from
lockdown: segmenting and shielding (S&S). Segmenting is
dividing the population into groups that are relatively homo-
geneous in healthcare characteristics or needs [4]. Shielding
is a way to protect people who are especially vulnerable to
severe COVID-19 outcomes by minimizing all interaction
between them and other people [5].
S&S addresses the concern that while the economic, social
and psychological costs of lockdown are distributed across
the entire population the public health burden is highly con-
centrated in identifiable populations of persons ‘vulnerable’
to COVID-19.
Key risk factors for vulnerability to COVID-19 are defined
by the World Health Organization (WHO) as those over
60-years old and those with underlying medical conditions
(such as cardiovascular disease, hypertension, diabetes,
chronic respiratory disease and cancer) [1,2]. Although risk fac-
tors for severe COVID-19 disease are still incompletely
understood, the UK government identified 1.5 million poten-
tially vulnerable individuals who have been advised to
shield themselves from infection (electronic supplementary
material, table S1).
There have been numerous mathematical modelling
studies of the actual and predicted impact of physical distan-
cing measures on COVID-19 epidemics (e.g. [6–11]). Very few
have explicitly considered shielding [12–14], and, despite its
inclusion as part of national and international strategy for
responding to COVID-19, shielding is not included by any
of the mathematical models being used to inform policy in
the UK, nor (to the best of our knowledge) any other country.
One modelling study in the UK concluded that physical dis-
tancing of those over 70-years old (including a 75% reduction
of contacts outside home and workplace) would contribute to
reducing the burden on the National Health Service (NHS),
though lockdown would still be needed to keep burden
within NHS capacity [15].
We therefore constructed amathematicalmodel designed to
explore the complex trade-offs between maintaining or increas-
ing protection for some population segments (shielding) and
maintaining or relaxing restrictions on other segments. Key
features of our approach include: (i) explicit representation of
the contact structure between three population segments:
vulnerable (v), shielders (s) and the general population (g);
and (ii) rapidly decaying post-infection immunity.
We use the model to explore the potential of S&S to meet
specific policy goals for the UK, namely: (i) to save lives; (ii) to
prevent NHS capacity being overwhelmed; and (iii) to protect
NHS staff. We consider three, increasingly restrictive, specific
objectives that are consistent with these policy goals:
(i) future level of infection in the vulnerable population
to be kept below the level at the start of lockdown;
(ii) future levels of infection in the entire population to be
kept below levels at the start of lockdown; and
(iii) no increase in numbers of cases or deaths after the
start of lockdown.
Objectives (i) and (ii) would allow levels of infection to rise
in at least some segments at some point in the future. Weemphasize that we do not regard any level of infection in any
subset of the population as acceptable: COVID-19 can be a
serious disease in all age groups and risk groups. However,
we suggest that COVID-19 in the non-vulnerable population
segments could be managed using a conventional response,
centred around good clinical care and proportionate public
health measures, without resorting to a lockdown of the
entire population.2. Methods summary
We developed a susceptible-infectious-resistant-susceptible
(SIRS) compartment metapopulation model. Briefly, the popu-
lation is divided into equal-sized segments with frequency-
dependent transmission occurring between segments (see the
electronic supplementary material, Methods for full details).
Each segment is comprised individuals from either the vulner-
able, shielder or general population. The contact structure for
the baseline realization of the model is shown in figure 1.
We use the model to explore plausible scenarios for the
dynamics of a COVID-19 epidemic during exit from lockdown.
The model used in this study is an (over)simplification and
therefore too simplistic to make specific predictions for
COVID-19; furthermore, there are too many uncertainties
about the epidemiology of COVID-19 for anything other than
short-term extrapolations of epidemiological data to be robust.
However,we are able to explore the trade-offs that exist between
increasing protection for the vulnerable population segments
and relaxation of restrictions for non-vulnerable segments. We
discuss below how the outputs of the model can be used to
inform policy.
Key considerations are the definition of and the size of the
vulnerable population. Our approach is informed by public
health guidance from the UK government; age and specified
underlying health conditions are of primary concern. We
therefore consider a set of models including some or all of
the following categories:
Table 1. Generic WAIFW matrix used for the model and the transmission parameters β, which defines transmission between subpopulations.
to/from vulnerable shielders
general
general 1 general 2 general 3
vulnerable β1 β1 β4 β4 β4
shielders β1 β1 β2 β2 β2
general
general 1 β4 β2 β3 β3 β3
general 2 β4 β2 β3 β3 β3





— individuals greater than or equal to 70-years old (differ-
ing from the WHO criterion);
— individuals in receipt of government advice to shield; and
— care home residents, those receiving care in the home and
hospital patients.
We enumerated these categories using published data
[5,16–18]. For our baseline scenario, we designated 20% of the
total population as vulnerable. We assumed a 1 : 1 ratio of
shielders to vulnerable. The remaining 60% of the population
are not in either category, and we refer to this as the 20-20-60
model. We estimate that the relative risk of severe disease in
the vulnerable 20% is 16 : 1 (see the electronic supplementary
material, Methods).
We also considered alternative scenarios where the most
vulnerable 14%, 8% or 2% are shielded and attributed relative
risks of severe disease to these fractions (see the electronic
supplementary material, Methods). We assumed that the
smaller the vulnerable population the fewer of their contacts
were with the general population: ranging from 3 in 5 for the
20-20-60 model to 1 in 5 for the 2-2-96 model (see the elec-
tronic supplementary material, Methods).
SIRS model parameters were informed by the UK’s
reasonable worst-case values R0 = 2.8 and doubling time =
3.3 days, giving an infectious period of 8.57 days and a dur-
ation of immunity of 365 days. [19]. Although the longevity
of the antibody response is still unknown, it is known that
antibodies to other coronaviruses wane over time (range:
12–52 weeks from the onset of symptoms) and homologous
re-infections have been shown [20]. SARS-CoV-2 IgM and
IgG antibody levels may remain over the course of seven
weeks [21]. We therefore chose a baseline value of 365 days
for the duration of immunity, although the sensitivity of the
model to this choice is tested in our analyses.
The contact structures in infectious disease models may
be informed by empirical data, e.g. from the POLYMOD
study [22]. However, such studies cannot inform COVID-19
modelling given the huge impact of physical distancing
measures on behaviour. Moreover, the POLYMOD study
did not explicitly consider contacts between the vulnerable,
shielder and general population segments. We therefore
used a simple as possible contact structure that captures the
key features of interest here.
Transmission rates (β values) were allowed to vary over
four phases (P1–P4). We implemented four distinct betas: β1:
transmission among and between vulnerable and shielders;
β2: transmission between shielders and general population;β3: transmission between general population; β4: transmission
between vulnerable and general population (See table 1 for
full ‘who acquires infection from whom’ (WAIFW) matrix).
Prior to lockdown (P1), we assumed fully homogeneous con-
tact between segments, noting that this implies a force of
infection from the general population three times higher than
from the vulnerable or shielder populations (figure 1). We
chose β values to give P1 Re = 1.7 (where Re is the effective
reproduction number—see the electronic supplementary
material, Methods for the explanation of Re), reflecting
measures already in place immediately before lockdown,
including voluntary self-isolation of cases and quarantining
of affected households. During lockdown (P2), we assumed
lower values for all β’s including some impact of the shielding
advice already in place, givingRe = 0.8 for the vulnerable popu-
lation and 0.9 for others. Over a 12-week period after lockdown
(P3), we varied β values linearly towards a final value either
greater than (relaxation) or less than (protection) P2 values,
afterwhich (P4) they remained constant. See the electronic sup-
plementary material, Methods for full details of β values used.
Initial conditions for the baseline model were chosen to
give a cumulative exposure of 6% at t = 78 days (one week
after the start of lockdown), consistent with emerging
serological data [23].
We conducted a series of sensitivity analyses on model
parameters, including analyses of the impact of different
levels of compliance and of active screening of shielders for
infection. A full description of the sensitivity analyses is
given in the electronic supplementary material, Information.3. Results
The baseline simulation for the 20-20-60 model generated a
scenario in which the combination of increased protection
of the vulnerable population and partial relaxation of restric-
tions for the rest of the population allow the second wave of
infection to occur, peaking in the vulnerable population on
141 days after the end of lockdown (figure 2a). In the vulner-
able population, the peak was lower than the first peak, but
in the other segments, it was higher. For this scenario, the
percentage of the severe disease burden occurring in the
vulnerable population is reduced from 80% to 55% (table 2).
Themodelled changes in β values (figure 2b) translated into
changes in the underlying effective reproduction number, Re.
For our baseline simulation during phase 4, although Rve was
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Figure 2. Trajectory plots for the proportion infected in the vulnerable, shielders and general populations, with accompanying β and Re plots for the baseline
scenario. Phases 1–4 are indicated. (a) Trajectory plots of the proportion of those infected in the vulnerable (green), shielders (red) and general (blue) populations,
shading depicts the different phases of enhanced shielding intervention. (b) Values for the different β over the course of the simulation as they are implemented for
the different intervention phases. In short, β1: transmission among and between vulnerable and shielders; β2: transmission between shielders and general popu-
lation; β3: transmission between general population; β4: transmission between vulnerable and general population (see table 1 for full WAIFW matrix). (c) Values of
the corresponding Re values (colours) for the different subpopulations and the overall Re (black) during the different intervention phases. (See the electronic sup-





than 1 in both non-vulnerable segments (Rse and R
g
e Þ (highest in
the general population) and overall (figure 2c). This has two
implications. First, that any outbreaks in an isolated vulnerable
population would not be self-sustaining, although a large
fraction of the vulnerable population can still ultimately be
infected owing to transmission from other segments experien-
cing a large outbreak and, second, that the eventual decline
in the epidemic is owing to the build-up of population immu-
nity (electronic supplementary material, figure S1). We note
that P2 Re < 1 implies that if lockdown were continued then
the fraction infected in all segments would eventually fall to
very low levels.Extending P2 beyond six weeks resulted in peaks that
were delayed (by more than the extension to the lockdown)
but were slightly higher (electronic supplementary material,
figure S2). Extending or shortening Phase 3 by ±6 weeks
resulted in peaks that were 37 days later or 37 days earlier,
respectively, but were of similar magnitude (electronic
supplementary material, figure S3).
Varying the start of P2 relative to the epidemic curve had
a major impact on subsequent dynamics (electronic sup-
plementary material, figure S4). This reflects substantial
differences in the fractions exposed to infection and therefore
the build-up of population immunity. Notably, if the














20-20-60 v 0.20 0.80 16 0.19 0.55
s + g 0.80 0.20 1 0.60 0.45
14-14-72 v 0.14 0.68 13.1 0.22 0.40
s + g 0.86 0.32 1 0.68 0.60
8-8-84 v 0.08 0.50 11.7 0.24 0.25
s + g 0.92 0.50 1 0.74 0.75
2-2-96 v 0.02 0.20 12.3 0.27 0.08
s + g 0.98 0.80 1 0.79 0.92
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Figure 3. Sensitivity analyses. Plots show the relative height of the second peak versus the first peak Iv as a function of relevant parameter value. Dotted lines
represent peaks of equal height. (a) Relative values of Re in P3/P4. The second peak is higher for a relative value greater than 1.22, corresponding to Re > 1.99.
(b) Adherence in P3/P4. 100% adherence equates to P4 Rve ¼ 0:4 (baseline value); 0% adherence equates to a pre-lockdown value of Rve ¼ 1:7. The second peak is
higher for adherence less than 74%. (c) Re in all phases. P1 Re values are shown; Re values in other phases are scaled accordingly. The second peak is higher for P1





lockdown started earlier in the epidemic curve than esti-
mated (lower I(t)) then the risk of an overwhelming second
wave is substantially greater (electronic supplementary
material, figure S4A).
Varying P2 β values (and so Re) had an effect on epidemic
dynamics, not altering the qualitative outcome butsubstantially affecting numbers of cases in all three subpopu-
lations (electronic supplementary material, figure S5).
Varying P3/4 β values had a substantial effect on epi-
demic dynamics and could alter the outcome. If P4 Re is
greater than 1.99 then the second Iv peak exceeds the height















































































































































































Figure 4. Results of a global sensitivity (FAST) analysis on three key outcome measures with regard to the proportion of the vulnerable population that become
infected (Iv): (i) the height of the second peak of Iv; (ii) whether the second peak of Iv is higher than the first peak and (iii) cumulative Iv 1 year after the start of the
lockdown. The bars show the partial variance of the individual model parameters. Higher bars indicate greater sensitivity of the model to that parameter. See
the electronic supplementary material, Methods for details of the sensitivity analysis and parameter ranges used. (a) Description of explored β value ‘blocks’
for the sensitivity analysis. β1, β2, β3 and β4 were broken down further to assess the sensitivity of the system to these values in greater detail. Lettering denotes
the explored β in the FAST analysis. (b) Sensitivity of the model outcome measures to the β values specified in (a). (c) Sensitivity of the model outcome measures to





Variation in adherence by the vulnerable population
during P3/4 was modelled as an impact on β1 and β4 values
(table 1), 100% adherence corresponding to the baseline scen-
ario target values and 0% to a return to phase 1 values.
Assuming that adherence has a linear effect on β1 and β4
values, if adherence is less than 74% then the second Iv peak
can exceed the height of the first (figure 3b).
Varying Re throughout also had a significant impact on
the outcome. At higher Re values the second peak remained
low, but at slightly lower values than our baseline scenario
(less than 1.63 in P1), the second Iv peak exceeds the height
of the first peak (figure 3c). This is because a smaller fractionwas exposed in the first wave of the epidemic, so there was
less population immunity.
Varying the rate of loss of immunity, ζ, also had a signifi-
cant impact on whether the second peak in the vulnerable
population exceeded the first (figure 3d ). At a longer average
duration of immunity (1/ζ), the second peak remained low,
but for shorter durations (less than 54 days), it exceeds the
height of the first peak. This illustrates that epidemic
dynamics are highly sensitive to the duration of immunity
and its impact on the development of population immunity.
Fourier amplitude sensitivity test (FAST) analysis indicated
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Figure 5. Heat maps showing the trade-off between relaxation (left to right on the horizontal axis) and increasing protection (top to bottom on the vertical axis).
(a) Heat maps describing the cumulative infected vulnerable fraction (Iv) 1 year after the start of lockdown for different combinations of β3 and β4 for different
values of β1 (rows) and β2 (columns). (b) As (a) but for whether the second peak of Iv is lower (green) or higher (red) than the first peak. (c) As (b) but all second






individual or sets of β values (figure 4) (See the electronic sup-
plementary material, Information for details on the FAST
analysis). Three outcome measures were assessed: height of
the second peak; whether the second peak is higher than the
first; and cumulative incidence over 1 year after the start of lock-
down. The value of transmission parameters within the general
population and between the general and vulnerable popu-
lations has the greatest impact on outcomes.
There is a clear, though asymmetric, trade-off between
increasing protection of the vulnerable population and relax-
ing restrictions on the non-vulnerable population (figure 5a).
This trade-off can be expressed in terms of combinations of
protection and relaxation that meet the specific policy goals
mentioned in the introduction (figure 5b–d). The more res-
trictive the policy objectives (increasing from 5b to 5d) the
smaller the parameter space that satisfies those objectives.
The higher the ratio of shielders to vulnerable (taken to be
2 : 1; 1 : 1 or 0.5 : 1) themore the second peakswere delayed and
suppressed (electronic supplementarymaterial, figure S6). This
reflects that different fractions of the total population (more or
fewer shielders) are subject to greater restrictions.Moving from the 20-20-60 model to the 14-14-72, 8-8-84
and 2-2-96 models, i.e. decreasing the vulnerable fraction
and increasing the proportion of their contacts with shielders,
allowed higher and earlier second peaks (electronic sup-
plementary material, figure S7). This resulted in increased
cumulative incidence in both the vulnerable and the shielder
plus general population segments (table 2). At the same time,
the fraction of the severe disease burden in the vulnerable
segment decreased. Together, this makes S&S less effective
for narrower definitions of the vulnerable segment.
The 20-20-60, 14-14-72, 8-8-84 and 2-2-96 models generate
different trade-offs in terms of combinations of protection
and relaxation that meet specified policy goals mentioned
in the introduction (figure 6). The trade-offs are complex
but two key patterns are apparent: as the size of the vulner-
able fraction is decreased there is (i) a larger parameter
space where no policy objective is satisfied and (ii) much
less scope for increasing β3, i.e. the rate of contact within
the general population. These constraints can be partially
eased by keeping β2 as low as possible, i.e. minimizing




















































































































8-8-84 model 2-2-96 model
b2 = 0.9 b2 = 1.85 b2 = 2.8 b2 = 0.9 b2 = 1.85 b2 = 2.8
Figure 6. Heat maps showing the trade-off between relaxation (left to right on the horizontal axis) and increasing protection (top to bottom on the vertical axis) for
the different models considered. The green shading indicates which of the policy objectives is met. Dark green: the second peak of Iv is lower than the first peak.
Middle green: as dark green plus all second peaks (Iv, Is, Ig) lower than first peaks. Light green: as middle green but dI/dt is negative or zero for at least one year






We note several caveats to our findings. We used relatively
simple models to explore a wide range of scenarios. These
scenarios are not predictions; in our view, there are too
many uncertainties about the epidemiology of COVID-19 to
make robust predictions beyond short-term projections of
epidemic data. There are three important sources of uncer-
tainty that may influence our results:(i) the contact structure between and within segments is
not well quantified. We carried out an extensive sensi-
tivity analysis (figure 4) to identify critical elements of
the contact matrix;
(ii) relaxing restrictions and increasing protection both
involve changes in behaviour. These are difficult topredict in advance though they can be monitored in
close to real time [24]; and
(iii) further, the relationships between behavioural changes
and transmission rates are also difficult to predict so
close monitoring of the epidemic remains essential.
Given these limitations, we simulated a range of plausible
scenarios, consistent with available data. We find that a
combination of increased protection of the vulnerable popu-
lation and relaxation of restrictions (lockdown) on the
non-vulnerable population can prevent an overwhelming
second wave of the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK.
This result is driven by the build-up of population immu-
nity during the first wave, particularly in the non-vulnerable
population (electronic supplementary material, figure S1).
The extent of population immunity for COVID-19 is uncer-




9lived population immunity will have a significant effect. It
has been argued that short-lived immunity (average duration
ca 1 year) will allow multiple waves of infection over many
years [25]. In the absence of any acquired immunity to
COVID-19, the epidemic becomes significantly more difficult
to control (electronic supplementary material, figure S8).
Other key drivers are the size of the vulnerable population
and their relative risk of severe infections. A smaller vulnerable
population may be logistically easier to protect, and perhaps
more likely to comply, but is likely to incur a smaller proportion
of the severe disease burden. At the same time, a consequence
of protecting a smaller proportion of the population and
relaxing restrictions for a larger proportion is that overall trans-
mission rates are higher. The implication is that S&S will be
much more difficult to implement successfully if the pro-
portion of the population designated vulnerable is too small.
That said, as risk factors for severe COVID-19 infections
become better understood, it should be possible to define the
vulnerable population more precisely.
Sensitivity analyses suggest that the most influential trans-
mission rates are those between the vulnerable and general
population segments (figure 4). This is important because
these rates can be reduced by physical distancing,which is con-
siderably more difficult to do for the shielders. However, the
same analysis also underlines the importance of transmission
within the general population, which is the main reservoir of
infection. It is therefore vital that transmission rates are kept
as low as possible, even if this population is allowed to exit
lockdown. Measures including self-isolation of cases, quaran-
tining of affected households, contact tracing and voluntary
physical distancing will be necessary to achieve this.
In all our scenarios, the vulnerable segment is subject to
increased protection indefinitely. S&S is alsomore likely to suc-
ceed if there is less or no relaxation of measures in the shielder
segment. These two observations underline the importance
of both identifying the vulnerable and shielder populations
as precisely as possible and of developing strategies for pro-
tection/shielding that minimize the disruption to normal
activities, not least to ensure high levels of adherence.
Policy objectives also impact on the range of S&S strategies
that could be used. The most restrictive policy objective we
considered—not allowing any increase in the number of cases—
cannot currently be achievedwithout physical distancingmeasu-
res. This leaves very little room for relaxing lockdown measures
even with greatly enhanced protection for the vulnerable.
A key component of S&S is a behavioural modification,
not only for the vulnerable and shielder segments but also
for the general population. We note that appropriate advice
could be issued quickly and cheaply, making this suitable
for any country affected by COVID-19.
In addition, S&S could be greatly strengthened by infra-
structure and technological support for effective biosecurity,
both at institutional (e.g. care homes, hospitals) and household
levels in order to keep transmission rates low between and
within shielders and vulnerable populations. For maximum
effectiveness, biosecurity requires training, high standards of
hygiene, effective personal protective equipment and screening
of everyone in contact with the vulnerable population.
Intensive screening would, ideally, include daily checks for
symptoms, daily tests for virus presence (preferably with
results available the same day to prevent pre-symptomatic
transmission), regular serological testing and monitoringof frequent contacts (e.g. household members) of shielders.
If too large a fraction of the population were to be classified
as ‘shielders’, this would quickly overwhelm current testing
capacity in the UK. Nonetheless, routine rapid testing
of shielders could have a significant impact and further
increase the scope for relaxing restrictions on the entire
population (electronic supplementary material, figure S9).
Finally, we note that S&S would not be implemented in
isolation. Measures such as contacting tracing (both tra-
ditional and app-based) could also facilitate exit from
lockdown [26]. In the long-term, effective therapeutics
and vaccines may alleviate the need for restrictive physical
distancing measures. Even then, however, we anticipate that
COVID-19 biosecurity will need to be built into the daily
routines and working practices of all hospitals, care homes,
other vulnerable institutions and some households, affecting
everyone who resides in, works in, or visits those locations.5. In context
This manuscript reports analyses conducted between
1 April 2020 and 20 May 2020, which aimed to investigate
the efficacy of a ‘segmentation and shielding’ exit strategy
for the first UK lockdown (23 February 2020). We note that the
original preprint can be accessed on medRxiv: (https://doi.
org/10.1101/2020.05.04.20090597).
This study aimed to address the need for alternative exit
strategies during the first UK ‘lockdown’. It was motivated
by results from contemporary modelling analyses which pre-
dicted large rebounds in COVID-19 in infection, specifically
within high-risk vulnerable segments of the population. Stra-
tification of the population by risk allowed quantification of
the impact of ‘shielding’ on COVID-19 dynamics, which
was also of interest during the first UK lockdown.
The parameters, model structure and assumptions in the
submitted manuscript are unchanged from the original
analysis. This was purposefully done to reflect the nature of
the study, which aimed to specifically address research ques-
tions that were under investigation during the first UK
lockdown. We note that the concepts proposed in this study
are applicable to a variety of infectious diseases where the
risk of severe outcomes is heterogeneously distributed across
the population.
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